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SUMMARY: Fishery management is a complicated task that often results in overfishing, overcapacity, and low profits for 
the industry. The management of shared fish stocks is particularly problematic, especially if national authorities pursue 
different objectives. Multi-species fisheries add further complexity to the problem. It is no accident that management tools 
frequently used in Northern Europe, such as total allowable catches and individual quotas, are not applied in the Mediter-
ranean Sea, where more target species are caught simultaneously. However, the European Commission intends to introduce a 
market-based driver for a strong, profitable fishing industry by phasing in transferable fishing concessions. This management 
approach is new for the Mediterranean, and it requires in-depth examination at institutional, legal, and economic levels. In 
this paper, after a review of the institutional setting, the economic perspective was analyzed by estimating the production 
function for the Italian small pelagic fishery in the Adriatic Sea. With the addition of Croatia to the European Union, the 
Adriatic Sea can become a Mediterranean communal exclusive fishing area. The results indicate that output measures such 
as total allowable catches and individual quotas should not cause serious discarding problems for this multi-species fishery. 
Keywords: fishery management, shared stocks, property rights, Adriatic Sea, small pelagic, production function.
RESUMEN: Gestión regional de pesquerías multiespecíficas basada en stocks compartidos y derechos de pro-
piedad: un caso Mediterráneo. – El manejo de la pesca es una tarea difícil que con frecuencia tiene como resultado la 
sobreexplotación de los recursos, la sobrecapitalización de las pesquerías y la baja rentabilidad de la industria pesquera. El 
manejo de los stocks compartidos es particularmente problemático, especialmente cuando las autoridades públicas persiguen 
objetivos diferentes. Las pesquerías multiespecíficas aumentan la complejidad del problema. No es accidental que instru-
mentos de manejo utilizados con frecuencia en el Norte de Europa, como los Totales Admisibles de Capturas (TACs) y las 
Cuotas Individuales, no sean aplicadas en el mar Mediterráneo, donde se capturan varias especies objetivo simultáneamente. 
De otro lado, la Comisión Europea piensa introducir un incentivo de mercado para favorecer el sector pesquero y hacerlo más 
fuerte y rentable, a través de la introducción paulatina de concesiones de pesca transferibles. Este modo de manejo es nuevo 
para el Mediterráneo, y requiere un análisis detallado a nivel institucional, legal y económico. En este artículo, además de 
una reseña del contexto institucional, analizamos la perspectiva económica estimando la función de producción para la flota 
pelágica italiana del mar Adriático. Con la inclusión de Croacia en la Unión Europea, el mar Adriático podría convertirse en 
una zona de pesca exclusiva comunitaria del Mediterráneo. Los resultados indican que las medidas de control sobre la pro-
ducción, como los TACs y las Cuotas Individuales, no ocasionarían serios problemas de descarte para este tipo de pesqueria.
Palabras claves: manejo pesquero, stocks compartidos, derechos de propiedad, mar Adriático, pequeños pelágicos, función 
de producción.
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INTRODUCTION
The European Commission (2011) intends to re-
form the Common Fishery Policy (CFP) to introduce 
a market-based driver for a strong, profitable fishing 
industry by phasing in transferable fishing concessions 
that are based on catch or effort management systems. 
This instrument, if applied to the Mediterranean Sea, 
will require a new kind of partnership between coun-
tries that share fish stocks. In fact, with the sole excep-
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tion of bluefin tuna management, neither EU Mediter-
ranean states nor third states have ever met to discuss 
quota allocations.
In the case of multi-species management, especially 
with transferable concessions, knowledge of fishery 
technology is necessary. From an economic perspec-
tive, this means estimating the production function for 
every species involved. This knowledge establishes 
possibilities and limits for the management of stocks 
that cannot be fished independently.
The objective of this paper is to discuss the applica-
tion of transferable fishing concessions in the manage-
ment of Mediterranean multi-species fisheries. The use 
of production functions will be explained and demon-
strated using an empirical application to the Adriatic 
fishery of sardines (Sardina pilchardus) and anchovies 
(Engraulis encrasicolus).
Notice that the reform process of the CFP was not 
yet concluded during the preparation and review of 
this paper (fisheries ministers, at the meeting of the 
Council of 28 January 2013, fully agreed to reach a 
political agreement on the reform before mid-2013), so 
final decisions are missing. However, both Council and 
Parliament (see conclusions of the “Agriculture and 
Fisheries” Council meeting on 12 June 2012) seem to 
be oriented toward a voluntary introduction of transfer-
able fishing concessions.
Institutional framework of the Mediterranean Sea
As defined by Munro et al. (2004), the term ‘shared 
fish stocks’, on the basis of geographical distribution 
of the resource and jurisdiction limits, can be broken 
down into four special cases: transboundary stocks 
(resources crossing two or more national jurisdictions), 
straddling stocks (stocks found both within a national 
jurisdiction and the adjacent high seas), highly migra-
tory species (a special case of the former), and high 
seas fish stocks (stocks found exclusively in the high 
seas). In Northern Europe, the management of shared 
fish stocks normally implies output controls in addi-
tion to input controls. Every year, the European Union 
(EU) establishes total allowable catches (TACs) for 
more than 30 species in the waters of the North Sea 
and Atlantic Ocean. Following the principle of relative 
stability, which was mentioned for the first time in a 
Community legal instrument in EEC Regulation No. 
170/83, the quantities (quotas) allocated annually to 
the various member states are based on fixed percent-
ages that were established according to the catches of a 
reference period (Morin 2000).
The adoption of measures for the allocation of 
fishing opportunities (provided by the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to the Council of 
the European Union) is strictly tied to the setting up of 
the maritime boundaries of the EU. Council Resolution 
of 3 November 1976 encouraged the member states 
to extend the limits of their fishing zones to 200 NM 
of their North Sea and North Atlantic coasts (Crean 
2000), creating a communal exclusive fishing area. The 
institution of sovereign right in a 200-NM exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) was successively formalized by 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
in 1982.
In contrast, both allocation of fishing opportunities 
and EEZs have been less common in the Mediterra-
nean Sea (at least until recently). Bluefin tuna (Thun-
nus thynnus) is currently the only Mediterranean spe-
cies for which fisheries are internationally regulated 
through TACs, under the International Commission for 
the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) frame-
work. On the other hand, EEZs and restricted forms of 
EEZs such as fishery protection zones and ecological 
protection zones have been established relatively re-
cently by most Mediterranean states (Suárez de Vivero 
et al. 2010, 2012). In regard to the Adriatic Sea, three 
countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Mon-
tenegro) have declared no jurisdictional rights apart 
from territorial seas; in October 2003 Croatia declared 
an Ecological and Fishery Protection Zone (EFPZ) that 
extended jurisdiction beyond its territorial waters to 
the midpoint division line in the Adriatic to preserve 
fish stocks. However, in March 2008, the Croatian 
Parliament voted to suspend applying the EFPZ to EU 
vessels. On the other hand, in December 2011Italy 
declared an ecological protection zone  covering only 
its western waters but not the Adriatic Sea. There are 
several reasons for the reluctance of several Mediter-
ranean states, Italy in particular, to adopt exclusive 
fishing zones until recently, such as the difficulty of 
drawing boundaries, concern about losing access to 
high seas if third countries make the same decision, 
and the small presence of third countries’ vessels in the 
potential exclusive fishing zones.
The General Fisheries Commission for the Medi-
terranean (GFCM), which is the regional fishery body 
established under the FAO constitution for the conser-
vation and management of living marine resources, has 
preliminarily identified more than 35 shared fish stocks 
in the Mediterranean, corresponding to more than 25 
species (GFCM 2006). Because of the current position 
of maritime boundaries, most of these stocks should 
be considered to be straddling stocks: in the Northern 
Adriatic, for example, stocks are found in three terri-
torial seas (Italian, Croatian, and Slovenian territorial 
seas, up to 12 NM), in the Croatian EFPZ (open only 
to EU vessels), and in the high seas. If Italy established 
a fishery protection zone, there would be no high-sea 
stocks, and the stocks would be considered to be trans-
boundary stocks instead of straddling stocks. Further-
more, considering the upcoming accession of Croatia 
into the EU, the stocks should be completely subjected 
to the CFP.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea calls upon states to cooperate, or at the very least 
to negotiate, with respect to the management and con-
servation of all categories of shared stocks (Munro et 
al. 2004). Several categories of institutions have been 
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developed for the cooperative management of these 
resources. Bilateral agreements are usual in the case 
of transboundary stocks and to regulate the access of 
vessels in the territorial seas of third countries (e.g. the 
Fisheries Agreement between Norway and EU). More 
complex situations, such as the cases of straddling 
stocks and highly migratory species, can be managed 
inside a Regional Fisheries Organization framework. 
From TACs to property rights
TACs and national quotas are rarely applied alone. 
Although TACs, when established on a solid scientific 
basis, actually guarantee the biological sustainability 
of the fisheries, the economic consequences can be 
unsatisfactory. Fishermen, in fact, would be forced to 
anticipate their national competitors in order to seize 
a greater share of the overall quota before it runs out. 
This ‘race to fish’ causes shorter fishing seasons and 
overcapitalization of the fleet. Thus, TACs have to be 
linked to other measures, including technical measures, 
fishing effort regulation or property rights (such as in-
dividual transferable quotas [ITQs] and territorial use 
rights in fisheries [TURFs]).
Advocates of property rights affirm that the use and 
management of natural resources inside a market sys-
tem are only efficient if there are no externalities (Dub-
bink and van Vliet 1996). In a fisheries system without 
property rights, resource users can simply take what 
they want, leaving less of the resource for others. If the 
resource is scarce, a technical negative externality is 
then created (Arnason 2000). Property rights partially 
remove external effects because maximum limits to 
the exploitation of the resource are imposed, and when 
rights are transferable, they turn the technical external-
ity into a pecuniary externality, the consequence of 
which can be solved through trading.
Under a system of individual non-transferable 
quotas, each company would carry out its annual op-
timization in accordance to the rights they have (Laxe 
2006). Fishermen (their quotas established) would 
compete to land catches economically, raising quality, 
and finding good markets (Scott 2000). However, only 
under a transferable system can economic efficiency 
be achieved because the most efficient companies 
have the possibility to buy quota rights from the less 
efficient.
The social consequences of transferable rights have 
been debated to a great extent in the literature, and 
resistance to their introduction is found in many coun-
tries (McCay 2000). On the other hand, a technical 
limitation for the application of TACs and related indi-
vidual quotas is recognized in the case of multi-species 
fisheries. If catches are composed of several target 
species or a composition of target species and by-catch 
species, individual (or total) quotas for one species 
can be exceeded before those of the others. When this 
happens, fishermen have to stop their fishing activity; 
alternatively, they can continue fishing the species they 
have a quota for, discarding the species whose quota 
has already been exceeded. Discarding of dead fishes 
is a harmful (and unethical) practice that counteracts 
the biologic rationale of the TACs system and leads to 
underestimated catches and biased management deci-
sions. The European Commission (2001) is determined 
to ban all forms of discards in the future CFP.
Strong multi-specificity of the fisheries has gener-
ally been the main reason to exclude the use of output 
measures (such as TACs and individual catch quotas) 
in the Mediterranean Sea. Recently, the European 
Commission (2011) has communicated its position on 
the reform of the CFP. It clarified that, for a sustaina-
ble management of fish stocks, maximum sustainable 
yield (MSY) must be the main target, and emphasis 
was put on two tools: multi-annual multi-stock man-
agement plans and transferable fishing concessions. 
Although no mention is made of the concrete form 
of the right concessions and no distinction between 
output and input rights is made, additional informa-
tion available on the Commission webpage explains 
unambiguously that “where fishing effort is used, as 
in the Mediterranean Sea, transferable fishing con-
cessions would apply to effort allocations”. A similar 
application inside the framework of the CFP can be 
found in the management of certain cod, plaice, and 
sole stocks of Northern Europe (Council Regulation 
No. 676/2007 and 44/2012), where the Council de-
cides the level of maximum allowable effort (some 
authors prefer speaking of total allowable fishing ef-
fort, Marchal 1999) each year; maximum allowable 
effort, which is measured in kilowatt days per mem-
ber state, can be successively allocated to individual 
vessels or groups of vessels by fixing the number of 
fishing days (or hours). In the Atlantic Community 
waters, the Spanish fleet fishing rights are expressed 
in terms of fishing days (MRAG consortium 2009, 
OECD 2006, Laxe 2006). In the Spanish fleet exam-
ple, fishing rights are transferable. 
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Most of the existing EU multi-annual managing 
plans based on TACs (such as the plan for fisheries 
exploiting stocks of plaice and sole in the North Sea 
[Reg. No. 676/2007] or the recovery plan for bluefin 
tuna [Reg. No. 302/2009]) demand that national fish-
ing effort be commensurate with catch quotas. This 
requires knowledge of the relationship between effort 
and catches. This knowledge becomes even more im-
portant if management is based on input tools rather 
than output tools.
As mentioned above, the application of output 
management tools (TACs and individual catch quotas) 
to multi-species fisheries can be problematic because 
quotas for 1 species can be exceeded before those of 
the others. We considered a simple example of TACs 
allocated to a single homogenous fleet. The fishery 
production function is the relationship that transforms 
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fishing effort into catches. We considered the follow-
ing general production function:
 Yi =  f(N,C,A,T,Bi) (1)
where total catches of species i (Yi) are a function of the 
number of vessels (N), a measure of capacity (C) such 
as gross tonnage or engine power, a measure of fishing 
activity (A), technology (T), and the stock biomass (B) of 
species i. This is true for all species i caught by the fleet. 
When policy makers set a TAC in order to limit the catch-
es of one species (on the basis of B level), fishermen have 
to decrease some of the elements composing the fishing 
effort. Generally, the most flexible element, at least in the 
short run, is the activity (number of days at sea).
When TACs are set for several species, fishermen 
should adjust fishing effort in order to reach TACs of 
all species, but this is impossible unless technology is 
changed to permit different catch ratios between spe-
cies to satisfy all the TACs. Otherwise, fishing activity 
has to stop or continue with discards. However, from 
an economic point of view, discards would not occur 
if the catches of all the species are needed to cover the 
variable costs of the fishing activity. In this case, af-
ter the quota of one species is taken, fishermen would 
not continue to operate because it would no longer be 
economical (Anderson 2000). More formally, marginal 
productivity must be higher than the cost of using one 
more unit of input (fishing day) to have discards. This 
means that TACs will not be the cause of discards if 
catches are composed of few economically important 
species, while they could be the cause of discards for 
species (whose quota has been exceeded) that are eco-
nomically marginal (because of low catches or prices).
Production function
Fishing effort of a fleet is usually measured us-
ing some kind of index. Often, this index is obtained 
by combining more elements. In the CFP definition, 
“fishing effort” is the product of the capacity (vessel’s 
tonnage in GT or engine power in kW) and the activ-
ity (time at sea) of vessels. Furthermore, capacity and 
activity are themselves indices that combine traditional 
economic inputs such as capital and labour.
Despite the convenience of this approach, on a the-
oretical level, inputs can be combined only if the pro-
duction function satisfies the condition of the Leontief 
theorem on separability (Huang and Lee 1976, Cham-
bers 1988). In this paper, we assume that production 
technology takes the form of a Cobb–Douglas function. 
A Cobb–Douglas function that is defined in terms of 
aggregated inputs is, again, strongly separable. How-
ever, as opposed to the classic biological approach, the 
inputs are considered to be non-homogenous. Similar 
to the model used by Taylor and Prochaska (1985), we 
used a Cobb–Douglas production function including 
the stock biomass (B) and several technical character-
istics normally given in official statistics, such as the 
number of vessels (N), a series of average measures of 
factors of capacity and activity (average GT, average 
engine power, average number of days at sea), and the 
technological progress (using an exponential trend) as 
inputs. We can represent it as follows: 
 Y AN G P D B eit t t t t it
t1 2 3
=
δ α α α β γ
 (2)
where G, P and D are the average GT, average engine 
power (kW), and average number of days at sea of the 
vessels, respectively. All the indices to be estimated (d, 
α1, α2, α3, and b) measure the elasticity of the output 
with respect to a specific input, with all the other in-
puts held constant; A refers to technology, while g is 
the instantaneous rate of technological progress mea-
suring the effect of time (t); both parameters have to be 
estimated too.
Exponent parameters different from 1 (different 
from 0 in the case of g) can have great economic and 
biologic importance, demonstrating that effort and 
density affect catchability (Wilberg et al. 2010). For 
example, d could be lower than 1 if a fishery is sub-
jected to gear competition or selection of suboptimal 
fishing locations because of the high number of ves-
sels. In contrast, the exponent parameter of average 
GT and engine power (α1 and α2) are higher than 1 if 
technology permits increasing returns to scale. Catches 
remain relatively high despite decreases in stock bio-
mass (b<1) if the stock is not randomly distributed and 
fishermen know the points where density is high; this 
situation is quite common for schooling species such as 
small pelagics. Finally g, the instantaneous rate of tech-
nological progress, is an important element to consider, 
especially when management is realized by means of 
effort regulation (actually, g is just a coefficient mea-
suring the effect of time: other variables besides tech-
nological progress could affect this measure).
The panel approach
The availability of effort and landings data broken 
down by Italian regions permits the use of a panel data 
approach. Because of the large number of data points 
(increasing the degrees of freedom) and the presence of 
variability in 2 directions (time and space), estimators 
that use panel data sets are generally considered to be 
more efficient than those using cross-sectional or time 
series data sets (Hsiao 1986, Verbeek 2004). Pooled 
ordinary least squares (OLS) was used for a panel data 
set of 5 regions and 10 years (1998-2007) estimating the 
log-linear version of (2). The tests to determine the sig-
nificance of differing group means, the Breusch–Pagan 
test and the Hausman test, are all performed to verify 
the existence of different intercept parameters across 
regions and the suitability of using a fixed-effects or a 
random-effects model rather than pooled OLS (Hsiao 
1986, Verbeek 2004). The inclusion in the model of 
single regional dummy variables is also tested: since in 
the log-linear version of (2) the constant refers to tech-
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nology, then different intercept parameters (positively 
or negatively affected by the values of dummy vari-
ables) would allow the differences existing at regional 
level to be proven and quantified (actually, different 
intercept parameters could also be due to environmen-
tal diversity or specific stock distribution).
The use of the panel approach entails that the total 
number of Italian vessels has to be broken down by 
region. This procedure prevented us from measuring 
the true (potential) competition effect (or scale effect) 
of the fleet. Furthermore, the Croatian vessels were 
not included in the model. For these reasons, we pre-
ferred to assume a unitary elasticity of the catches with 
respect to the number of vessels (d≡1 in Eq. 2). This 
linear relationship also involves that (2) can be consid-
ered as a per vessel production function.
Short-run profit maximization
After estimating the production functions of an-
chovies and sardines, it is possible to build a simple 
graphical tool for identifying the optimal short-run 
strategy of a vessel (Clark 1990). As mentioned above, 
days at sea are the only input that firms (vessels) can 
change to maximize profit in the short run. We used a 
vessel of average engine power (300 kW) with trawling 
technology as a reference firm. Stocks’ biomasses were 
also assumed at average levels. Revenue was given by 
the sum of anchovy landings and sardine landings. 
The price of landings was considered an endogenous 
function of the total Adriatic landings (as attested by 
Mulazzani 2011, Mulazzani and Camanzi 2011, and 
Mulazzani et al. 2012). An inverse double-log demand 
function was then estimated as follows:
 ln p = α + b ln q (3)
where p is the average Adriatic price and q is the total 
Adriatic landings. 
Total costs per vessel were distinguished into fixed 
costs, capital costs (both independent from days at sea), 
and variable costs per day at sea. Labour costs were not 
included because of the difficulty of calculating them 
and because the revenue is habitually shared between 
the vessel owner and the crew members. Value added 
(including the reward of labour) was used instead of the 
economic profit as the objective of the maximization 
function. Assuming that every vessel has the same av-
erage characteristics, this maximization problem may 
be solved as a non-cooperative game with N players 
finding the Cournot–Nash equilibrium. In this paper 
however, a graphical approach (instead of an analytical 
approach) was used.
Data: the Adriatic small pelagic fishery
Approximately 40000 t of anchovies and 25000 
t of sardines are caught every year in Central and 
Northern Adriatic (GSA17); more than 99% of the 
catches are attributable to the fleets of Italy and Croa-
tia (Camanzi et al. 2012). The Italian small pelagic 
fleet consists of approximately 112 pair trawlers and 
44 purse seiners, and fishing capacity (measured as 
total engine power) has had a 17% decrease in the last 
decade. Official Croatian statistics do not distinguish 
fishing effort data by gear; according to a study per-
formed by the AdriaMed project in 2004, the Croatian 
small pelagic fleet was formed by 20 pelagic trawl-
ers and 233 purse seiners. Both Italian and Croatian 
management tools presently include effort regulation 
(license scheme) and technical measures (minimum 
mesh sizes, minimum fish sizes, and temporary inter-
ruption of the activity).
In this paper, we used IREPA (Istituto di Ricerche 
Economiche per la Pesca e l’Acquacoltura) data for the 
effort characteristics of the Italian fleet broken down by 
Adriatic regions (Fig. 1). However, landings and stock 
biomasses of sardines and anchovies were obtained 
from CNR-ISMAR (Centro Nazionale delle Ricerche, 
Istituto di Scienze Marine) for the period 1998–2007 
(latest estimations are not yet available for publica-
tion). Table 1 shows regional averages of fishing effort 
and landings per vessel. Vessels from Friuli Venezia 
Giulia (northern corner of GSA 17) and Abruzzo (in 
the southern part) are purse seiners, while in the other 
regions (central GSA 17) pelagic trawlers are used. Sea 
depth in front of Abruzzo coast (more than 100 meters) 
is higher than that in other regions.
The values in Table 1 clearly show that catches 
per vessel are lower in the two regions where vessels 
make use of purse seines. However, while the purse 
seiners of Friuli Venezia Giulia are small vessels (10 
Gt) with low engine power (109 kW) and low fishing 
activity (104 days at sea), the purse seiners of Abruz-
zo are vessels with an average size (98 Gt) and engine 
power (331 kW) that are at the same levels as those 
of trawlers. The fishing activity of Abruzzo’s vessels 
(135 days) is intermediate between the small purse 
seiners of Friuli Venezia Giulia (104 days) and trawl-
Fig. 1. – Italian regions and bathymetry of the Northern Adriatic 
Sea (GSA 17). 
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ers (160-180 days). This is not surprising because 
purse seiners (especially small vessels) are not able 
to operate in bad weather conditions. The average 
vessel-size is lower than that of other European small 
pelagic fleets, such as the French and Spanish fleets 
(according to Anderson et al. 2010, average values 
for the French and Spanish fleets are the following: 
French pelagic trawlers: Gt 237, kW 476; Spanish 
purse seiners: Gt 148, kW 327.)
Fixed and capital costs for a vessel of average en-
gine power and variable costs per day at sea have been 
calculated using data from IREPA and STECF (Scien-
tific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fishery; 
Anderson et al. 2010). Anchovy is the main target of 
the Italian small pelagic fishery. Anchovy prices are 
higher (1.36 €/kg) than sardine prices (1.08 €/kg) 
(IREPA). However, prices depend strongly on catch-
ing technology. Landings of purse seiners are usually 
of better quality (fishes are less damaged) and can get 
a higher price than the landings of trawlers. Discarding 
by the Adriatic small pelagic fishery has been inves-
tigated very little; Santojanni et al. (2005) concluded 
that moderate discarding of sardine can be found in 
specific geographic zones when the length of the fish 
is smaller than the market requirements. However, they 
described fishermen behaviour before the year 2000.
Finally, data provided by CNR-ISMAR on stock bi-
omass show, for the reference period, a stable situation 
for sardines, while for anchovies a peak is observed in 
2005 followed by a declining period. Average biomass 
at sea is around 134000 t for anchovies and 87000 t for 
sardines.
RESULTS
Production function
Table 2 shows the results of pooled OLS for anchovy 
and sardine by using a per vessel production function 
(elasticity of total catches with respect to the number 
of vessels is assumed to be equal to 1). Average GT 
had to be excluded because of collinearity problems 
with engine power. The test result for the significance 
of differing group means counts against the null hy-
pothesis that the pooled OLS model is adequate and 
is in favour of the fixed-effects alternative. However, 
tests on single regional dummy variables indicated that 
Abruzzo is the only region with a significantly differ-
ent intercept parameter; thus, only a dummy for the 
Abruzzo region was added to the pooled model in order 
to provide an explicit quantification of the different ef-
fect of technology in this region. On the other hand, 
Friuli Venezia Giulia, the other region where purse 
seiners are used, does not have a significantly different 
intercept parameter. Finally, both the Breusch-Pagan 
test and the Hausman test counted against the random-
effects alternative.
The first impression is that the model fits the data 
better for the anchovy production function (R2=0.93; 
all coefficients are statistically significant, except the 
instantaneous rate of technological progress) than for 
the sardine production function: in the second case, the 
explanatory power of the model (R2=0.89) was almost 
completely attributable to the deterministic trend and 
dummy. It is not surprising that the Abruzzo dummy 
Table 1. – Average characteristics of the regional fleet and average catches per vessel. Source: IREPA, CNR-ISMAR.
Gear - Region Vessels(number)
Average days 
at sea Average GT
Average engine 
power (kW)
Catches of 
anchovies per 
vessel (t)
Catches of 
sardines per 
vessel (t)
Purse seine
Abruzzo 26 135 98 331 37 4
Friuli Venezia Giulia 22 104 10 109 19 34
Pelagic trawl
Emilia Romagna 48 174 54 297 168 72
Marche 26 160 121 434 252 50
Veneto 36 180 63 337 221 75
Table 2. – Estimated production function coefficients and test results on residuals. The values within parentheses are standard errors.
Significance level: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.
Variable Anchovy Sardine
Constant –13.184 (2.281)*** 4.690 (6.725)
Engine power (P) 1.638 (0.139)*** –0.101 (0.232)
Days at sea (D) 0.814 (0.295)*** 0.835 (0.497)*
Stock biomass (B) 0.394 (0.169)** –0.292 (0.535)
Abruzzo –1.446 (0.118) *** –2.465 (0.196)***
Time (t) 0.021 (0.023) –0.208 (0.026)***
R2
Adj. R2
0.93
0.92
0.89
0.87
Du-Wa. Stat
Heterosc.a
Normalityb
1.55 (0.063)
15.62 (0.683)
0.66 (0.721)
1.16 (0.002)
10.78 (0.931)
6.97 (0.031)
a
 Null hypothesis that there is no heteroskedasticity was tested using the White procedure (p-value in brackets).
b
 Null hypothesis that residuals are normally distributed was tested using the Doornik and Hansen procedure (p-value in brackets).
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showed a negative sign in both cases, because tech-
nology (A in equation (2), quantified by the intercept 
and dummy parameters) is different in that region. On 
average, a purse seiner from Abruzzo is able to catch 
around 75% less anchovies and 90% less sardines than 
a trawler of the same size.
For anchovy, the sign of all estimated coefficients 
was coherent with theory. Elasticity of catches with 
respect to engine power was greater than 1; catch 
elasticity was lower (0.81) with respect to days at sea 
and even lower (0.39) with respect to stock biomass. 
For sardine, elasticity of catches with respect to days 
at sea was very close to that of anchovy (0.83), while 
the effect of engine power and stock biomass was 
not statistically significant. The instantaneous rate of 
technological progress showed an unexpected negative 
sign. For anchovies, independent restriction tests were 
performed to verify whether the coefficients were sta-
tistically different from 1. Statistical differences were 
observed for engine power and stock biomass but not 
for days at sea. The coefficient of days at sea was not 
statistically different from 1 in the sardine production 
function as well.
Short-run value added maximization
Results of the double-log inverse demand function 
using years from 1998 to 2007 indicated that the price 
flexibility was –0.48 for anchovies and –0.36 for sar-
dines. These values were rather close to those obtained 
in a previous study (–0.42 and –0.27, respectively) that 
was performed using a longer time series and more 
variables (Mulazzani 2011). 
Figure 2 shows revenue per vessel, total costs (ex-
cluding labour costs) per vessel, and valued added as 
a function of days at sea. A vessel of average engine 
power (300 kW) with trawling technology is used as 
a reference firm. Figure 2c shows the value added if 
sardines were not caught or if they were caught and 
discarded. The chart clearly shows that value added 
becomes positive with more than 26 fishing days. 
Value added then reaches its maximum (€50000) with 
approximately 168 days at sea, and it successively de-
creases because of lower catchability and lower prices. 
If anchovies were the only landed species, the maxi-
mum value added would be achieved at 134 fishing 
days, it would be halved (€25000) and anchovy land-
ings would be 17% lower than in the previous case.
DISCUSSION
The results of this simple model entail interesting 
elements of discussion. First, only the anchovy pro-
duction function was observed to perfectly fit the data. 
This probably means that technology, including fisher-
men knowledge and behaviour, is strongly addressed 
to the catch of anchovies, while sardine catches seem 
to be more accidental. Second, the significance of the 
Abruzzo regional dummy (affecting the intercept pa-
rameter, which represents technology) showed that the 
pelagic fleet cannot be taken as a whole; in fact, this 
variable roughly assesses the efficiency differences 
existing between large purse seiners and pelagic trawl-
ers. For management purposes, especially when tools 
affecting fishing effort are used, the fleet should be 
broken down into three groups: the pelagic trawlers of 
Veneto, Emilia Romagna, and Marche form a homoge-
neous group. The purse seiners of Abruzzo, which fish 
in the southern and deeper seas of the GSA 17, are a 
separate group, even though the vessel characteristics 
(GT, engine power) are similar to those of trawlers; ef-
ficiency of these purse seiners has proven to be lower 
than efficiency of trawlers, meaning that a unit of fish-
ing effort of these vessels is not equivalent to a unit of 
fishing effort of a trawler. Finally, small purse seiners 
of the northern GSA 17 (Friuli Venezia Giulia) should 
form a third group, separated from the southern purse 
seiners of Abruzzo, because they proved to be as ef-
ficient as the pelagic trawlers.
Third, technological progress was apparently ab-
sent for the anchovy production function. This can 
be an advantage, at least for management purposes. 
Technological progress, in fact, should make manage-
ment tools based on fishing effort difficult because, in 
order to maintain sustainability, fishing effort should 
be constantly reduced (Squires and Vestergaard 2009). 
The negative value for the sardine production function 
is a strange result. It would be an interesting result if it 
Fig. 2. – Economic results of an average vessel (with trawling technology) as a function of the number of days at sea: revenue and costs (a), 
value added (b), and value added if sardines are not landed (c).
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meant that fishermen are able to change technology to 
fish fewer sardines and more anchovies (thus, fisher-
men could easily use individual quotas). However, this 
result could be the effect of some biological change, 
such as change in the age class distribution or in the 
geographic concentration of the stock.
Fourth, it was noteworthy, although not surprising, 
that the elasticity of anchovy catches with respect to 
stock biomass was lower than 1 (0.39). This implies 
that fishermen can easily find anchovy schools and that 
catches can be relatively high, although stock biomass 
is decreasing. This characteristic, clearly favourable 
for the fishery industry, should be considered because 
it can be responsible for unexpected stock collapse and 
controversies on the state of the stocks between the 
operators and the scientific community.
Fifth, vessel-size (using engine power as an index 
of fixed investments) permitted increasing returns to 
scale. This should provide an incentive for licence 
owners to use larger vessels, such as in Spain and 
France. However, because of the current CFP entry/
exit scheme forbidding the growth of fleet capacity, 
this could be achieved only with reduction of the num-
ber of vessels. The elasticity of catches with respect to 
days at sea was slightly lower than 1 (0.81), meaning 
that there are days (or seasons) when the catchability of 
fish is lower because of weather conditions and distri-
bution of the stocks.
As explained above, a firm should continue fishing 
as long as the revenue of a fishing day is higher than its 
costs. The profitability of fishing can be judged only 
by considering the landings of both species and price 
flexibility. Price drop because of abundant landings is 
as important as reduction in catchability for determin-
ing the optimal number of days at sea for every ves-
sel. Without forgetting regional differences and vessel 
characteristics (it is quite clear that larger vessels are 
able to stay at sea for more days than smaller vessels), 
our model using a vessel of an average size (with trawl-
ing technology) can explain why the days at sea of the 
Adriatic fishery are fewer than the potential fishing 
days (approximately 230 days, excluding weekends 
and one imposed seasonal interruption).
The short-run value added maximization model 
also shows that sardines cannot be considered unim-
portant for the firm, even though catches and prices 
for sardines are lower than those of anchovies. In fact, 
without sardine landings, the number of profitable fish-
ing days, anchovy catches and the value added would 
all be reduced. Theoretically, if firms had to discard 
all sardine catches (e.g. if sardine TAC=0), per-vessel 
discard would be approximately 80% of the potential 
landings without limitations (no TACs).
Reflections on management tools
Our results also provide useful indications for the 
potential application of new management tools based 
on transferable fishing concessions. TACs and ITQs, 
in particular, could be applied knowing that discards 
should be of little impact. For example, TACs on an-
chovies should not cause any discard problems because 
the sardine fishery alone is not profitable and vessels 
would stop their activity once the anchovy quota is 
achieved. In the case of sardines, TACs allowing 
80% (or more) of potential catches should not cause 
discards. However, if TACs are lower than 80% of 
potential catches, firms have an economic incentive to 
continue fishing anchovies and discard sardines.
In the long run, it is to be expected that, as the litera-
ture and prior applications suggest (Spagnolo 2006), 
a system based on ITQs will lead to biologic sustain-
ability and economic efficiency, but it also entails 
negative social effects. More efficient firms would ac-
cumulate property rights (and capital), while working 
relationships on the boat would change in favour of the 
owner, who might sell the firm’s quota, regardless of 
the crew’s interests (McCay 2000). In the end, there 
will be fewer vessels and they will be larger in size. 
These consequences would be partly limited if restric-
tions of transferability were imposed between regions 
and gears.
On the other hand, transferability of fishing ef-
fort could be considered with respect to both activity 
(days at sea) and capacity (kW of engine power) or a 
combined index of these two measures (kW days). The 
concept of transferable fishing days seems an appropri-
ate tool for short-run management needs, for example, 
when recruitment of one species fails and catches have 
to be quickly reduced. Apparently, this tool would 
cause fewer negative social consequences, because the 
number and size of vessels could remain the same in 
the long run. However, efficient firms will buy (or hire) 
fishing rights from less efficient firms as long as the 
profit of the last fishing day is equal for every firm, 
and some firms may decide deliberately to sell all their 
fishing days and leave the industry.
In the case of fishing effort concessions, biolo-
gists have to find a compromise in order to establish 
a reasonable optimal biomass for both species that is 
sustainable with a determined level of fishing effort. In 
fact, MSY cannot be simultaneously maintained for all 
species. Depending on this decision on the maximum 
level of fishing effort, the economic performance of the 
fleet may be higher or lower than that of a management 
system using TACs.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we estimated the production func-
tions for the fisheries of anchovies and sardines and 
built a graphical tool to establish the number of days at 
sea that permits the maximization of the value added. 
The results provide concrete elements of reflection to 
prepare new management tools for the Adriatic small 
pelagic fishery.
Long-term conclusions cannot be complete without 
a biological model that reproduces the growth of the 
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stocks (see Silvestri and Maynou 2009). However, we 
can expect TACs and individual catch quotas to be 
good management tools when multi-species fisheries 
target few species (as in the case of the small pelagic 
fishery), especially if every species has economic im-
portance. In the case of shared stocks, the initial alloca-
tion of national catch quotas can be easier than national 
effort quotas if, as in the case of Croatia, data on fish-
ing effort are missing or incomplete.
However, these considerations on small pelagic 
fishery can hardly be applied to demersal fishery. Ac-
cording to GFCM (2006), there are around ten shared 
demersal stocks in the Adriatic Sea, and most of them 
are caught together by bottom trawlers. In this case, 
TACs are difficult to enforce, and fishing effort con-
cessions could be managed more easily by fishermen 
and authorities. 
In this context, the accession of Croatia into the EU 
(scheduled for 1 July 2013) should improve the avail-
ability of scientific and economic data and facilitate 
cooperation for the management of shared Adriatic re-
sources. A communal fishing area, similar to the North 
Sea, would be obtained if Italy establishes a fishing 
protection zone to the midpoint division line. Man-
agement decisions based on transferable concessions 
should be easier to implement under this Community 
framework than under a regional fishery body such as 
the GFCM (a comparison between the management 
frameworks existing in the Adriatic Sea and in the 
Bay of Biscay for the anchovy fisheries is discussed in 
Mulazzani et al. [2013]). However, the GFCM must be 
the basic institution for the management of straddling 
stocks shared with third countries.
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